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Abstract. Our proposal is to apply a Game Theoretic approach to the
games played in Agent Reputation and Trust Final Competitions. Using
such testbed, three international competitions were successfully carried
out jointly with the last AAMAS international Conferences. The corre-
sponding way to define the winner of such competitions was to run a
game with all the participants (16). Our point is that such game does
not represent a complete way to determine the best trust/reputation
strategy, since it is not proved that such strategy is evolutionarily stable.
Specifically we prove that when the strategy of the winner of the two first
international competitions (2006 and 2007) becomes dominant, it is de-
feated by other participant trust strategies. Then we found out (through
a repeated game definition) the right equilibrium of trust strategies that
is evolutionarily stable. This kind of repeated game has to be taken into
account in the evaluation of trust strategies, and this conclusion would
improve the way trust strategies have to be compared.
1 Introduction
The way agents achieve cooperation solving complex tasks is a design key factor
in MultiAgent Systems. However, since Agent Systems intend to be open, agents
have to establish some kind of social control that could be defined as designed
or emergent [1]. The former implemented through Electronic Institutions, such
as Certification Authorities, when trust/ is concluded from the observation of
universal and objective norms, but in many real-world interactions trust is emer-
gent, depends on local and subjective evaluations shared between partners (rep-
utation). In recent years, trust/reputation research community has grown a lot,
many trust/reputation models have been proposed [5]. Since it was very difficult
to compare their respective performances as many ad-hoc implementations and
metrics have been applied, a testbed platform for agent trust/reputation models
was developed: the Agent Reputation and Trust (ART) Testbed [2]1. Using such
testbed, three international competitions were successfully carried out jointly
with the last AAMAS international Conferences. During these years the ART
1 http : //megatron.iiia.csic.es/art− testbed
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testbed has been used by dozens of researchers, and the ART-testbed members
have discussed, patched and updated the platform using the feedback from the
Competitions (see discussion notes on ART web page) and from the agent trust
community (through the discussion Board of ART). These criticism produced
some changes in protocols [6], and outlined new directions of work [4]. This crit-
icism is essentially focused on the scalability of ART games since with more
agents the right use of reputation would make more sense playing an increasing
role to win the game. Additionally a differentiation between the way trust is
acquired/modeled/updated (trust model) and the way trust is used/applied in
decisions (trust strategy) would be desirable.
This paper suggests a new way ART can be used in competitions to evaluate
agents. In section 2 we explain our domain: the ART testbed. Afterwards, in sec-
tion 3, We show how a game-theoretic approach can be applied in this domain.
In [6] and [4] did not even mention the possibility of applying a game-theoretic
approach, they just remark the needing of thinking on new different ways to eval-
uate trust/reputation models. Our contribution is to define a way to determine
the ability of a trust strategy to win when it is dominant in the society of agents.
With such intention, we propose in section 4 a new different kind of repeated
games with ART testbed. In order to achieve this goal the corresponding games
have been run with the participant agents of ART competitions in section 5.
2 ART Testbed
The ART testbed compared different trust strategies using reputation models in
the art appraisal domain. In this domain, agents are players/competitors that
appraise paintings and implement trust strategies. Figure 1 shows an outline of
ART domain.
In each timestep, the simulator engine presents each appraiser agent with
paintings (generated by the simulation engine) to be appraised, paying a fixed
fee f for each appraisal request. Very close valuations of paintings to the real
value would lead to more future clients, and therefore to more earnings to win
the competition. The corresponding steps of a turn in ART games is shown in
figure 2.
Each painting belongs to an era among a set of artistic eras while agents
have different levels of expertise (ability to appraise) in each era. An agent can
appraise its own paintings and may request opinions (at a fixed cost) from other
appraisers to get its valuation of the painting close to the real value (specially
useful in the eras where the agent has low expertise). An agent can act also as
provider of appraisals in response to opinion (about paintings) requests from
other agents Additionally, an agent can similarly request reputation information
about other appraisers (at a fixed and much lower cost than opinions). The
winner of an ART game is the agent who earned more money along the number of
iterations that were run in the game. Such earnings come from different sources:
paintings appraised to the own clients (Client Fee), paintings appraised to other
appraiser agents (Opinion Cost) and reputations shared with other appraiser
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Fig. 1. ART domain outline. Source [2]
Fig. 2. Steps of a gameturn in ART domain. Source: [3]
3
agents (Reputation Cost), where Client Fees are the main source of income
since: Client Fee >> Opinion Cost >> Reputation Cost.
3 Evolutionarily Stable Trust Strategies in ART
3.1 Trust and ESS
In game theory and behavioural ecology, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
is a strategy which, if adopted by a population of players, cannot be invaded by
any alternative strategy. An ESS is a Nash equilibrium which is “evolutionarily”
stable meaning that once it is fixed in a population, natural selection alone is
sufficient to prevent alternative (mutant) strategies from successfully invading.
The ESS was developed in order to define a class of solutions to game theo-
retic problems, equivalent to the Nash equilibrium, but which could be applied
to the evolution of social behaviour in animals. Our proposal is to apply this
Game Theoretic approach to the games played in Agent Reputation and Trust
Final Competitions. Although in ART games there is no reproduction neither
evolution, this approach make sense since the goal of trust strategies is to es-
tablish some kind of social control over malicious/distrustful agents through the
exchange of local and subjective evaluations between partners (the so called rep-
utation in ART terms). So the idea of applying trust strategies in agent societies
is to filter out the agents who do not behave properly in such society. Therefore,
we could state that the loser of the direct confrontation between/among trust
strategies would be expelled out of such society of agents. We can even think
in terms of evolution if we assume that agents may change of trust strategy.
Following that line, it seems to be reasonable that agents with a failing trust
strategy would get rid of it and they would adopt a successful trust strategy in
the future. Through this analogy we can define a repeated game in ART domain
that would allow us to evaluate the ability of participant agents in past compe-
titions to be an evolutionarily stable trust strategy. Furthermore, we can define
as an evolutionarily stable trust strategy is a strategy which, if becomes domi-
nant (adopted by a majority of agents) can not be defeated by any alternative
strategy.
3.2 Repeated Game Definition to Find a ESS in ART
Using ART testbed, three international competitions were successfully carried
out jointly with the last AAMAS international Conferences. The corresponding
way to define the winner of 2007 competitions was to run the same game with
all the participants (16) several times (until 10 times) plus some dummy agents
(9) with enough timesteps per game (defined as 60 minuted length to complete
each game)2. Our point is that such game does not represent a complete way to
determine the best trust strategy, since it is not proved that such trust strategy
is evolutionarily stable. Therefore we propose a simulation of the evolution of












Fig. 3. Evolution Simulation in ART games
a society of ART participant agents through a set of consecutive games, where
evolution is implemented assuming that agents with a failing trust strategy would
get rid of it and they would adopt a successful trust strategy in the next ART
game. Where we consider a failing trust strategy the one who lost (earning less
money than the others) the last ART game, and we consider the successful trust
strategy to the one who won the last ART game (earning more money than the
others). By this way replacing in consecutive games the participant who lost the
game by the one who won it. We will then find out if there is a trust strategy
among the participant agents in ART competitions that is evolutionarily stable.
An outline of the ART game defined to simulate a evolutive society of agents
applying trust strategies is shown in figure 3.
3.3 Finding a ESS among 2007 ART Competitors
Once the type of game to be run has been defined, we have applied it to
the participant agents of 2007 ART competition (the code of last competition
(2008) participants is not public and we want our experiments to be repeatable).
First we show in table 1 the participants and the resulting earnings of such
competition3:
As we consider these participants (without dummy agents) as the first game
in our evolutive simulation, then, if the relative positions are similar we have
2 iam2 agents, no xerxes agent and the other 14 agents as participants of the
second game. We proceed in same way including an extra winner agent and
excluding the loser agent in consecutive games. Next we show in table 2 the
agents that win and lose each consecutive game with the corresponding earnings.
The earnings showed in table 2 are computed in same way as the competition,
as a normalized bank balance (bank balance divided by number of timesteps in
the game), and game length and game repetition defined in the same way (60m
maximum, 10 times) so all the experiments shown here can be easily repeated.
As it was expected, since there are no dummies to easily cheat, the earnings of
3 http : //megatron.iiia.csic.es/art− testbed/competition results2007.html
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Table 1. 2007 ART Competition Results
Rank Agent name Affiliation Earnings
1 iam2 Univ. Southampton 539377
2 jam Univ. Tulsa 353700
3 blizzard Bogazici Univ. 335933
4 zecariocales Pontificia Univ. Rio 319564
5 spartan Univ. Girona 311777
6 artgente Univ. Trento 298897
7 uno Univ. Girona 293324
8 reneil Nanyang Tech. Univ. 269905
9 marmota Univ. Girona 264356
10 novel Univ. Murcia 229501
11 alatriste Univ. Carlos III Madrid 225276
12 rex Univ. Warwick 211467
13 IMM Univ. Carlos III Madrid 200440
14 lesmes Univ. Carlos III Madrid 183655
15 agentevicente Univ. Carlos III Madrid 181932
16 xerxes U.S. Airforce Research Lab. 148610
Table 2. Evolution Simulation Results
Game Number Winner Earnings Loser Earnings
1 iam2 17377 xerxes -8610
2 iam2 14321 lesmes -13700
3 iam2 10360 reneil -14757
4 iam2 10447 blizzard -7093
5 agentevicente 8975 Rex -5495
6 iam2 8512 alatriste -999
7 artgente 8994 agentevicente 2011
8 artgente 10611 agentevicente 1322
9 artgente 8932 novel 424
10 iam2 9017 IMM 1392
11 artgente 7715 marmota 1445
12 artgente 8722 spartan 2083
13 artgente 8966 zecariocales 1324
14 artgente 8372 7285 iam2 2599
15 artgente 7475 iam2 2298
16 artgente 8384 UNO 2719
17 artgente 7639 iam2 2878
18 iam2 6279 JAM 3486
19 iam2 14674 artgente 2811
20 artgente 8035 iam2 3395
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Table 3. Comparison of Rankings of agents
Competition Rank Evolution Rank Agent name Excluded in game number
6 1 artgente -
1 2 iam2 -
2 3 JAM 18
7 4 UNO 16
4 5 zecariocales 13
5 6 spartan 12
9 7 marmota 11
13 8 IMM 10
10 9 novel 9
15 10 agentevicente 8
11 11 alatriste 6
12 12 rex 5
3 13 Blizzard 4
8 14 reneil 3
14 15 lesmes 2
16 16 xerxes 1
agents are much lower than those of the competition and the differences between
winners and losers becomes closer in the last games.
Specifically with this experiment we have proved that although the strategy
of the winner of the 2007 international competitions spreads in the society of
agents (until 6 agents implementing iam2 trust strategy out of 16 participant
agents), it never becomes dominant (there is no majority of iam2 agents). In
fact it is defeated by other trust strategy artgente, which becomes dominant (11
artgente agents out of 16). Therefore iam2 is not an evolutionarily stable trust
strategy, so its superiority as winner of 2007 competition is, at least, relative.
We also found out that the right equilibrium of trust strategies that form an
evolutionarily stable society is composed by 10-11 Artgente agents and 6-5 iam2
agents. Finally, from the order in which agents are excluded from the society, we
can propose an alternative ranking of trust strategies in table 3 which :is very
different from the competition ranking.
4 Conclusions
Due to the relative success of the trust and reputation research, and specifi-
cally of ART testbed, a good design foundation of fair comparisons among trust
strategies will spread the inclusion of reputation and trust communications into
more general service-oriented systems that would be truly distributed. According
to that intention, we have defined what an evolutionarily stable strategy would
be in trust domain, and how it can be proved in ART competitions through
a repeated game with a simulation of evolution. We have applied such game
definition to the participant agents of 2007 competition and we found out that
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the winner of such competition was not implementing an evolutionarily stable
strategy. As a conclusion we stated that this kind of repeated game has to be
taken into account in the evaluation of trust strategies, and this conclusion would
improve the way trust strategies have to be compared, not just thinking about
the testbed, also about the games definition.
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